Somalia’s long coastline is once again drawing in outside powers, making it less a symbol of national revival and more a testing ground for larger rivalries in the western Indian Ocean. Recent agreements with Turkey, Pakistan and China are shaping a pattern that looks less like Somali empowerment and more like Mogadishu being folded into other states’ strategies.
The stakes are not limited to the Horn: for global shipping, regional stability and India’s security planners, what happens off Somalia has wider consequences.
How has Turkey embedded itself in Somalia’s security?
Turkey has been the most visible foreign military partner since 2017, when it established its largest overseas base in Mogadishu. Its trainers have produced Somali infantry battalions and officers, giving Ankara direct access to the day-to-day structure of the Somali armed forces.
In February 2024, the relationship widened to include maritime security guarantees alongside an oil and gas exploration agreement covering Somali waters. Reports of a proposed Turkish spaceport on Somali soil— marketed as a satellite launch site but equally usable for missile testing— have only increased regional attention on Turkey’s role.
What does Pakistan’s new agreement mean?
On August 28, 2025, Somalia’s cabinet approved a five-year defence memorandum with Pakistan. The pact includes training Somali troops in Pakistan’s staff colleges, naval technical support, and the creation of a joint defence committee.
Islamabad’s navy has commanded multinational counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden before, and its experience with convoy escort and boarding operations is directly relevant to Somali waters.
But critics in neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia warn that bilateral Pakistani training and ship visits, unless tightly linked to multinational frameworks, risk being seen less as state-building and more as bloc politics.
How does China’s presence shape the picture?
China’s first overseas base in Djibouti sits a short distance from Somali lanes, giving it a permanent hard point next to the Gulf of Aden. Combined with Chinese finance in ports, railways and logistics across East Africa, Beijing exerts influence on maritime corridors even without a formal Somali base.
For many analysts, the concern is not a declared “trilateral” between Turkey, Pakistan and China, but the functional convergence: Turkish trainers in Mogadishu, Pakistani officers expanding their footprint, and Chinese capital underwriting the infrastructure that binds the region together.
Somalia has agency in how this evolves. By requiring all assistance to pass through official channels with clear time limits and mandates tied to piracy prevention and coastal defence, it could present itself as a responsible manager of an important sea route.
Without such guardrails, the Horn risks becoming a stage for competing external agendas, raising costs for shippers and making regional waters less predictable for all.