The Indus Basin, a sprawling and vital river system, sustains hundreds of millions across South Asia. Its waters traverse national borders and geopolitical fault lines, flowing through China (7.5%), India (33.6%), Afghanistan (6.3%), and predominantly Pakistan (52.6%). Despite its strategic significance and ecological interdependence, the basin lacks any overarching regional water governance mechanism.
Instead, it relies on a single bilateral framework: the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan under the auspices of the World Bank.
Hailed for its resilience, the IWT has withstood wars, military skirmishes, and frozen diplomacy. But in April 2025, India placed the Treaty in abeyance, marking a decisive shift in policy after another bloody episode of cross-border terrorism: this time in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir.
This move is not just a diplomatic warning. It signifies a strategic recalibration with potentially transformative consequences for regional water politics, security, and peace.
The Treaty that weathered war
The Indus Waters Treaty, in force since January 12, 1961, is often celebrated as one of the most durable international water-sharing arrangements. Structured in three parts, the Treaty allocates the three eastern rivers Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej to India and the three western rivers Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab to Pakistan, with limited allowances for non-consumptive and run-of-the-river uses by both sides.
Its annexures detail provisions for agriculture, hydropower, infrastructure development, and dispute resolution, all aiming to create predictability and peace over the shared waters. But even the most resilient treaties are not immune to the corrosive effects of persistent proxy warfare and terror sponsorship.
The roots of instability: Pakistan’s proxy strategy
Pakistan’s trajectory from Cold War collaborator to a global epicentre of jihadi militancy is well documented. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence wing, has institutionalised the use of armed non-state actors as instruments of foreign policy, particularly in Afghanistan and India.
Groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) have received active support from Pakistan’s security apparatus in terms of training, logistics, funding, and sanctuary. This sponsorship extends beyond ideological or religious alignment. It’s part of a deliberate strategy to keep India off balance, particularly in Kashmir, without inviting a full-scale war.
For decades, Pakistan has followed the strategy of “Bleed India with a Thousand Cuts,” encouraging low-intensity conflict through terror attacks and insurgency. The ISI’s backing turned what was once a political agitation in Kashmir into a violent jihadist movement.
A trail of blood: Terror from Parliament to Pahalgam
The strategic cost of Pakistan’s proxy war is immense, marked by an unending series of terror attacks, many of which have reshaped India’s domestic security architecture and foreign policy orientation:
- 2001 Parliament Attack: Five JeM terrorists breached the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, killing nine and almost triggering war.
- 2008 Mumbai Attacks: Ten LeT operatives executed a 60-hour siege, killing over 170 civilians and injuring 300+.
- 2016 Uri Attack: JeM militants killed 19 Indian soldiers at a forward base, prompting surgical strikes across the LoC.
- 2019 Pulwama Bombing: A Jaish suicide bomber targeted a CRPF convoy, killing 40 personnel and leading to the Balakot air strikes.
- 2025 Pahalgam Attack: The latest in this grim sequence occurred on April 22, 2025, when LeT-linked gunmen attacked tourists and Hindu pilgrims in Baisaran Valley, killing 26 and injuring 20.
This last attack appears to have been the tipping point. Investigations traced it back to Pakistani handlers, and India’s patience finally snapped.
India’s response: Putting the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance
In direct response to the Pahalgam carnage, India placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, a diplomatic term implying suspension rather than outright withdrawal. This decision marks an escalation that fuses hydropolitics with counter-terrorism strategy.
The symbolism is stark: if Pakistan cannot prevent its territory from being used to launch terrorist attacks, India may reconsider the goodwill that underpins the Treaty. The message is clear: blood and water cannot flow together.
Though India hasn’t altered river flows yet, it may now explore the full extent of its rights under the Treaty, such as accelerating upstream hydropower projects, restricting data sharing, and limiting consultations.
What suspension means for Pakistan
As the lower riparian state, Pakistan is acutely vulnerable to any disruptions in the flow of the western rivers. Its dependence on the Indus system is existential, both economically and socially. If the Treaty remains suspended or is revoked in the future, the consequences would be severe:
- Agricultural Collapse: Over 80% of Pakistan’s crops, including wheat, rice, and cotton, rely on Indus basin waters. Reduced flows would devastate yields, GDP, and rural livelihoods.
- Water Stress and Salinisation: With 43% of its irrigated land already salt-affected, groundwater over-extraction would further degrade arable land.
- Energy Crisis: Pakistan generates about 30% of its electricity from hydro dams like Mangla and Tarbela. Less water means more blackouts.
- Internal Strife: Any perceived inequities in water distribution could reignite inter-provincial disputes, particularly under the strained 1991 Water Accord.
- Trade Shocks: Water-intensive exports like Basmati rice and textiles could collapse, cutting into foreign reserves and weakening the rupee.
- Food Security Emergency: Water scarcity could lead to famine-level crises, disproportionately affecting vulnerable rural populations.
Why India’s decision matters
India’s approach to the Indus Waters Treaty has, until now, been characterised by restraint and principle. Even after egregious provocations such as Mumbai 2008 or Pulwama 2019, it refrained from touching the IWT. By upholding the treaty even during war and terrorism, India aimed to show the world that a norms-based international order can prevail.
But the persistent failure of Pakistan to dismantle its terror infrastructure, even after repeated warnings and offers for dialogue, has left New Delhi with few options. India’s new approach seeks to tie terror accountability to treaty stability.
Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri summed up the sentiment aptly: “Pakistan’s reputation as a nexus of global terrorism is entrenched in numerous terrorist incidents worldwide…peace cannot be negotiated at the barrel of a gun or under the threat of suicide bombers.”
The rhetoric of retaliation: Pakistan’s belligerence
Pakistan’s response has been predictably provocative. In May 2025, Pakistan Army spokesperson Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry declared, “If you stop our water, we will stop your breath.”
Such inflammatory statements reaffirm India’s stance that Islamabad continues to favor sabre-rattling over serious introspection. They also underline the risks of escalation in an already volatile region.
The road to reconciliation: Can the taps flow again?
India has not declared the IWT void yet. The treaty remains in limbo, held hostage by Pakistan’s unwillingness to abandon terrorism as a state policy. However, India has kept the diplomatic window open. The abeyance, while strategic, is not irreversible.
India has repeatedly invited Pakistan to resume normalised relations, provided Islamabad dismantles terrorist networks, ceases cross-border infiltration, and shows demonstrable intent toward peaceful coexistence. The choice before Pakistan is stark but simple: terrorism or treaties, provocation or partnership.
Hydrodiplomacy or hydrowarfare?
The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty is not merely a water-sharing issue. It’s a strategic inflection point in South Asia’s security architecture. It underlines how deeply the nexus of terrorism and geopolitics has eroded bilateral trust.
As rivers continue to flow from the Himalayas into the Indus plains, they carry not just sediment and snowmelt, but also the weight of unresolved grievances and the promise of possible peace. Whether these waters become a bridge to reconciliation or a fault line of confrontation will depend on one decisive variable: whether Pakistan chooses terror over transformation.